Diotimus of Tyre Testimonies in Greek
The Testimonies of Diotimus of Tyre is a lost doxographical work known only through a handful of secondary references. Diotimus, a Stoic philosopher of the 1st century BCE, was a noted polemicist against Epicureanism. The work was likely a collection of authoritative statements from earlier philosophers, compiled to serve as a reference for Stoic doctrine or for use in sectarian debate. While no direct quotations from the work survive, its title and genre suggest it was a compilation of philosophical doctrines, focusing on Stoic ethical or physical principles and illustrating the use of authoritative quotations in philosophical argumentation. The work is not directly attested in the manuscript tradition, and its existence is inferred from fragments; it is not listed among Diotimus’s known works in the surviving entry of the Suda. The few surviving testimonia about the work, which discuss criteria for knowledge and the ultimate good, are often mistakenly taken as indications of its original structure. Diotimus is primarily remembered for his polemical forgeries of letters intended to discredit Epicurus. Within this context, the Testimonies represents his more scholarly polemical activity, contributing to the tradition of Stoic compilations used in Hellenistic philosophical disputes, though its specific influence remains untraceable.
| 1 | AËT. II 17, 3 (D. 346) Διότιμος Τύριος ὁ Δημοκρίτειος τὴν αὐτὴν τούτοις εἰσηνέγκατο γνώμην. |
| 2 | CLEM. Str. II 130 [II 184, 16 St.; s. Z. 16] ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις Δ. τὴν παντέλειαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἣν εὐεστὼ προσαγορεύεσθαι ὑπὸ Δημοκρίτου, τέλος ἀπέφηνεν. |
| 3 | SEXT. VII 140 Δ. δὲ τρία κατ’ αὐτὸν [Demokrit, 68 A 111] ἔλεγεν εἶναι κριτήρια, (1) τῆς μὲν τῶν ἀδήλων καταλήψεως τὰ φαινόμενα (‘ὄψις γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα‘, ὥς φησιν Ἀναξαγόρας [59 B 21a], ὃν ἐπὶ τούτωι Δημόκριτος ἐπαινεῖ), (2) ζητήσεως δὲ τὴν ἔννοιαν (‘περὶ παντὸς γάρ, ὦ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ τὸ εἰδέναι περὶ ὅτου ἔστιν ἡ ζήτησισ‘ [Plato Phaedr. p. 237 B]), (3) αἱρέσεως δὲ καὶ φυγῆς τὰ πάθη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὧι προσοικειούμεθα, τοῦτο αἱρετόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ὧι προσαλλοτριούμεθα, τοῦτο φευκτόν ἐστιν. |